Register source
Source profiles identify CA/TSA, certificates, trust anchors, policy OIDs and applicable CP/CPS/TSA documents.
MOBILE-ID · TRUSTED LTANS
Trust Infrastructure
Timestamping, certificate paths, status data and key configuration for verification.
Outcome and scope
Supply versioned trust inputs for evidence generation and validation while retaining historical context.
Documentation scope Workflow design and integration contract; operational configuration is confirmed per environment.
| Prepare | Receive |
|---|---|
| Timestamp request, trust anchors, TSA certificates, OCSP/CRL, evaluation time and HSM/KMS configuration. | Validated token, versioned trust path and certificate-status result with freshness bounds. |
Participants: Trust-source administrators, key custodians and relevant TSA/CA operators.
Workflow and decision points
Validate responses
Check signatures, digest binding, time and status material. Timeout and UNKNOWN require distinct outcomes.
Retain material
Retain references or hashed copies under policy and record collection/evaluation times; current data does not replace historical inputs.
Change source safely
Fallback TSAs require approved conditions; new source revisions need compatibility tests and retained history.
States, guards and authority
| Current | Guard | Actor | Next | Artifact / recovery |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proposed source [model] | Check CA/TSA, policy and interface | Trust administrator | Approved source [model] | Keep tests and version; a provider logo is not interoperability proof. |
| Response received [model] | Validate signature, imprint, time and status | Trust Adapter | Accept / reject / insufficient [model] | UNKNOWN differs from GOOD; timeout is not revocation. |
| Source rotation [model] | Fallback meets approved controls | Trust + Operations | New source revision [model] | Retain historical material/origins; do not overwrite old certificates. |
Exceptions and controls
| Situation | Action | Boundary |
|---|---|---|
| OCSP UNKNOWN | Record unknown status and apply policy. | Do not infer GOOD. |
| Key or certificate changes | Rotate and check bindings under the profile. | Do not overwrite historical source profiles. |
| HSM/KMS not provisioned | Identify a deployment dependency. | No claim of protection by an unprovisioned HSM. |
Authorization, approval and recovery
Check TSA EKU, MessageImprint, ESSCertIDv2 when applicable and OCSP freshness. HSM protects keys; it does not by itself establish evidence validity.
OCSP UNKNOWN differs from GOOD. Apply an explicit failure policy; obtain suitable CRL/OCSP material or mark evaluation INDETERMINATE.
Reconciliation artifacts and acceptance
Retain TSA certificates, trust inputs, token digest, OCSP/CRL results and evaluation time; do not replace historical inputs with current status.
- Wrong
MessageImprint, untrusted certificates and OCSP UNKNOWN must produce distinct reasons. - A TSA change preserves prior token origins and explanation of earlier evidence chains.
Integration and data contract
This module includes administration without a public write endpoint. Review interface scope and deployment conditions.
Technical input and references
| Element | Definition |
|---|---|
| Input | Timestamp request, trust anchors, TSA certificates, OCSP/CRL, evaluation time and HSM/KMS configuration. |
| Output | Validated token, versioned trust path and certificate-status result with freshness bounds. |
